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Baseball might be the American pastime, but by time spent, there
is no activity that Americans spend more time doing than driving. 1
Americans love their vehicles, and long-distance driving through
suburban and exurban sprawl is a marker of the American lifestyle.2
From the early days of the Ford Model T, through the driving heyday of
the 1950s and 1960s, to the electric and self-driving cars of today, the
automobile has had a defining influence on American culture.3 While
Americans may value the freedom of the open road, they nonetheless
accept basic traffic regulations to ensure safety. Such laws usually
dictate how one drives—how fast, how orderly, or how one must prove
their abilities before receiving a driver’s license. Most people likely
believe that those laws may not dictate where or how much one drives
on public roads.4 Despite this perception, legislators have implemented
statutes and ordinances with the purpose of restricting where and when
drivers may proceed on public roads.5 Despite the potential for
legislative overreach, the outcry in response to these rules has been
tepid, with questions as to their constitutionality rarely raised before
courts.6
In 2017, the town of Leonia, New Jersey, instituted a municipal
ordinance which barred drivers who neither live nor work in Leonia
from driving on its public roads during rush hour, ostensibly to limit
gridlock to the George Washington Bridge.7 This law follows a long
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tradition of statutes enacted to limit undesirable drivers on public streets
at undesirable times.8 The Third Circuit has held that when reviewing
statutes limiting intrastate travel, as opposed to the more frequently
discussed interstate travel, courts must apply intermediate scrutiny. 9
Intermediate scrutiny requires that an important government interest be
addressed through means, such as a statute, that are substantially related
to that interest.10 This note will argue that while the history of so-called
“cruising” jurisprudence or caselaw concerned with the rights of drivers
to drive aimlessly on public roads—does grant municipalities some
degree of discretion to limit intrastate travel, this statute likely fails
intermediate scrutiny.11
The concept of “cruising” has a long history in American culture,
and imagination.12 Depicted in many famous films like American
Graffiti, groups of young Americans have, for years, gathered in their
vehicles, driving aimlessly through town together.13 “Cruising” has
been defined as:
A social phenomenon primarily involving 20th Century American
youth owning or having access to automobiles, and essentially
consists of the practice of driving slowly around a set ‘loop’ of
streets in an urban area, especially during evenings, weekends, or
other free time, and frequently entails talking between
automobiles at stoplights, stopping randomly to greet
acquaintances on the street, or engaging in like activities causing
congestion and delay for those with legitimate business in the
area.14
In practice, the act of cruising has led to both ample celebration and
detraction.15 Supporters assert that cruising is “a rite of passage
celebrating freedom, adulthood, and the authority to drive a car.”16
Detractors allege it leads to increases in crime, drug dealing,
Legal?, NORTHJERSEY.COM (Jan. 25, 2018, 6:18AM), https://www.northjersey.com
/story/news/bergen/leonia/2018/01/25/leonia-ban-commuter-traffic-local-roadslegal/1059993001/.
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Gofman, supra note 1, at 16.
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Gofman, supra note 1, at 16.
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Gofman, supra note 1, at 16.
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Gofman, supra note 1, at 16.
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Gofman, supra note 1, at 6.
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Gofman, supra note 1, at 16.
14
Russell G. Donaldson, Validity, Construction, and Effect of Statutes or
Ordinances Forbidding Automotive “Cruising”—Practice of Driving Repeatedly
Through Loop of Public Roads Through a City, 87 A.L.R. 4th 1110 (1991).
15
Gofman, supra note 1, at 4.
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Gofman, supra note 1, at 4 (citing Nesreen Khashan, State Street Cruiser a
Loser; Court Rejects His Constitutional Appeal of Traffic Ticket, SALT LAKE
TRIBUNE, Sept. 29, 2000, at B3).
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prostitution, gang activity, and traffic infractions, as well as more
mundane effects, such as congestion and traffic gridlock.17
I. BACKGROUND AND CASE LAW

The town of Los Gatos, California was among the first
municipalities in the nation to enact a cruising ban in 1980.18 In doing
so, the town defined cruising as:
Driving a motor vehicle on a highway (1) for the sake of driving,
without immediate destination, (2) at random, but on the lookout
for possible developments, or (3) for the purposes of (a)
sightseeing repeatedly in the same area, and (b) while driving with
the purpose of socializing with other motorists or pedestrians.19
The ordinance prohibited this activity in the central business district of
the town.20 The law was struck down several years later, largely on
procedural grounds, as a result of substantive California state law
governing municipal lawmaking.21 The constitutionality of the ban was
not addressed.22 Nonetheless, this early attempt to define and prohibit
aimless driving set the tone for future municipal ordinances—especially
those distinguishing “social” and “repetitive” forms of driving from
ordinary driving.23
The hallmark case addressing the constitutionality of limiting
drivers on public roads is Lutz v. York,24 a case decided by the Third
Circuit in 1990, just a decade after the Los Gatos ordinance was struck
down. The Supreme Court has not yet addressed this issue
substantively.25 In this case, the Third Circuit reviewed a statute passed
by the city of York, Pennsylvania prohibiting aimless driving in a
certain part of the city at night.26 Somewhat differently from the Los
Gatos statute, this statute defines “unnecessary repetitive driving”—as:
Driving a motor vehicle on a street past a traffic control point, as
designated by the York City Police Department, more than twice
in any two-hour period, between the hours of 7:00 p.m. and 3:30
a.m. The passing of a designated control point a third time under
the aforesaid conditions shall constitute unnecessary repetitive
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Gofman, supra note 1, at 4.
Gofman, supra note 1, at 9.
Gofman, supra note 1, at 9.
Gofman, supra note 1, at 9.
Gofman, supra note 1, at 10.
Gofman, supra note 1, at 10.
Gofman, supra note 1, at 10-11.
899 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1990).
Id.
Id. at 257.
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driving and therefore a violation of this Ordinance.27
The ordinance passed the city council at the behest of the local police
department, fire department, and other municipal emergency service
personnel.28 Legislative findings concluded the ordinance should be
passed so as to:
[R]educe the dangerous traffic congestion, as well as the excessive
noise and pollution resulting from such unnecessary repetitive
driving, and to insure sufficient access for emergency vehicles to
and through the designated city thoroughfares now hampered by
this repetitive driving of motor vehicles.29
The York Police Department asserted that traffic caused by cruising
creates traffic at levels worse than during rush hour.30 The York Fire
Department argued that this traffic “standstill” creates a danger to town
safety, with emergency vehicles unable to proceed through town easily
during nighttime hours.31 The fire chief testified that “seconds, not even
minutes,” are critical to town safety, creating a strong government
interest in regulating traffic.32
The plaintiffs in Lutz challenged the ordinance on the grounds that
such a statute violates their constitutional right to travel and that the
ordinance is overbroad.33 The lower court did not conclude the
ordinance violated a right to travel, because it found that precedent only
created a “liberty interest” in intrastate travel, and not a “fundamental
right.”34 Therefore, rational basis scrutiny was applied, and the interests
provided by York was found constitutionally sufficient.35
In reviewing the lower court’s decision, the Third Circuit sought to
examine all possible constitutional grounds upon which a fundamental
right to localized intrastate travel could be based.36 The Circuit Court
determined that Supreme Court precedent firmly guarantees a
fundamental right to interstate travel.37 In Shapiro v. Thompson,38 the
Supreme Court struck down durational residency requirements as a
prerequisite to obtaining welfare benefits on Equal Protection grounds,
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

Id.
Id. at 257-58.
Id. at 257.
Lutz, 899 F.2d at 257.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 258.
Id.
Id.
Lutz, 899 F.2d at 262.
Id. at 258.
394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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because the law distinguished long-time local residents from local
residents who had moved between states. This holding meant that
residents have the right to travel between states and relocate temporarily
or permanently to other states without being treated differently by local,
state, or federal law.39 After the holding in Shapiro, the Supreme Court
broadened its scope, holding, among other things, that minimum
durational residency requirements may not be used to establish
eligibility to vote or to receive free non-emergency medical care.40
Although these cases illustrate a strong regard for freedom of
movement, the Third Circuit found that they do not address the
Constitution’s requirements for intrastate travel.41
The Third Circuit did, however, find that the Supreme Court
previously referenced a constitutional right to freedom of movement.42
In Kolender v. Lawson,43 the Supreme Court examined an anti-loitering
statute. The Kolender Court struck the statute down as vague, focusing
mainly on the lack of adequate notice provided in the text.44 However,
the Third Circuit noted that the dicta suggested “‘a constitutional right
to freedom of movement’ potentially implicated by the statute.”45
Likewise, in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,46 which also
addressed an individual’s challenge to a municipal anti-loitering statute,
the Third Circuit found that the Supreme Court’s inclusion of a number
of poems and works of literature mentioning wandering and walking as
“part of the amenities of life,” indicate an acknowledgment of freedom
of movement. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the statute
discriminated against the poor and declined to address the issue of
freedom of intrastate travel.47 The Third Circuit concluded that it could
not find direct justification for a right to localized intrastate travel in
Supreme Court jurisprudence; therefore, it considered other
constitutional grounds.48
First, the Third Circuit examined the Article IV Privileges and
Immunities Clause to see if it could justify a fundamental right to
localized intrastate travel.49 The Court examined a very early case,
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

Lutz, 899 F.2d at 258 (citing Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618).
Id. at 259.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983)).
Id. at 260 n.8.
Lutz, 899 F.2d at 260 n.8 (quoting Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358).
Id. (quoting Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972)).
See Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 171 (1972).
Lutz, 899 F.2d at 262.
Id.
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Corfield v. Coryell,50 which recognized the right to travel and work outof-state under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. In that case, the
dicta noted that:
The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in,
any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional
pursuits, or otherwise . . . may be mentioned as [one] of the
particular privileges and immunities of citizens, which [is] clearly
embraced by the general description of privileges deemed to be
fundamental . . . .51
This dicta implied the creation of a right to travel both through and
within a state; however, subsequent precedent held that the Article IV
Privileges and Immunities Clause does not, itself, create rights.52
Likewise, the Third Circuit found that the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Privileges and Immunities Clause is also inapplicable because it does
not independently create rights.53 Similarly, the Third Circuit found that
the Supreme Court had already refused to recognize a right to travel as a
right of citizenship in United States v. Wheeler,54 holding it only
applicable when a law impedes a citizen’s ability to travel to exercise
the rights and duties of citizenship. Additionally, the Third Circuit
found that the Commerce Clause does not establish the right to freedom
of localized intrastate travel, as the ordinance in Lutz did not facially or
in effect burden the interstate flow of commerce.55 Finally, the Third
Circuit found that the Equal Protection Clause did not establish such a
right because the statute did not define groups or distinguish between
groups; rather, the ordinance barred certain actions on public roads.56
Ultimately, the Third Circuit determined that the Due Process
Clause established a fundamental, substantive right to localized
intrastate travel.57 The Court located dicta in early due process cases
implying a right of intrastate travel.58 For example, in Williams v.
Fears,59 a case decided in 1900, the Supreme Court found that “the right
of locomotion, the right to remove from one place to another according
to inclination, is an attribute of personal liberty . . . secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment . . . .” Likewise, a separate line of cases from
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59

Id. (citing Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825)).
Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 552.
Lutz, 899 F.2d at 262 (citing Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1869)).
Id. at 264.
Id. at 264-65 (citing United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 (1920)).
Id. at 265.
Id. at 265-66.
Id. at 266.
Lutz, 899 F.2d at 266.
179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900).
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the 1950s and 1960s concerning the question of whether the federal
government may constitutionally deny passports to Communists also
implied a broad due process right to travel.60 In Kent v. Dulles,61 the
Supreme Court held that “[t]he right to travel is a part of the ‘liberty’ of
which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under
the Fifth Amendment.” Although this statement implies that the
Supreme Court interpreted a right to travel as an important—and
perhaps fundamental—right, the Third Circuit nevertheless found that
the Supreme Court focused its holding directly on the issues of freedom
of association.62 Subsequent case law muddies this understanding, with
some cases—such as Haig v. Agee63—upholding restrictions on
international travel while distinguishing those restrictions from a
general constitutional right to interstate travel within the United States.
Because interstate travel is specified in Haig, the Third Circuit
concluded that drawing a constitutional right to localized intrastate
travel from this line of cases would be difficult.64 The court
subsequently concluded that “no constitutional text other than the Due
Process Clauses could possibly create a right of localized intrastate
movement, and no substantive due process case since the demise of
Lochner has considered whether the clause in fact does create such a
right.”65
Therefore, the court applied the test “usually articulated for
determining fundamentality under the Due Process Clause,” which asks
whether the right must be “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” or
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”66 The court also
weighed, and ultimately adopted, Justice Scalia’s understanding of the
Due Process Clause, holding that it protects “unenumerated rights ‘so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental.’”67 Using this standard, the court concluded that the right
to free intrastate movement—by vehicle or on foot—is “implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty” and “deeply rooted in the Nation’s
history.”68 Therefore, the Court recognized that a fundamental right to

60

Lutz, 899 F.2d at 266.
357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958).
62
Lutz, 899 F.2d at 266.
63
Id. at 266-67 (citing Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981)).
64
Id.
65
Id. at 267.
66
Lutz, 899 F.2d at 267 (quoting Palko v. Conn., 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Moore
v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)).
67
Id. at 268 (quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989)).
68
Id.
61
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localized intrastate movement exists.69
However, the Third Circuit was uncomfortable reviewing this
fundamental right under strict scrutiny, which is customary for putative
violations of due process rights.70 Additionally, the court recognized
that if strict scrutiny applies to the York statute, it would plainly fail, as
the ordinance does not constitute the least restrictive means of
preventing traffic problems.71 Instead, the court analogized the
fundamental right to localized intrastate movement to the First
Amendment right to freedom of speech.72 Just like freedom of speech
jurisprudence permits reasonable, content-neutral and limited time,
place, and manner restrictions on speech, the court held that time, place,
and manner restrictions are necessary and reasonable for regulated
intrastate movement as well.73 Therefore, the Third Circuit held that
this fundamental right should be reviewed under intermediate scrutiny,
with an eye toward ensuring that ordinances are “narrowly tailored to
meet significant city objectives.”74 Under this reading, the court found
that York’s ordinance constituted an appropriate use of the city’s police
power, and that the ordinance was narrowly tailored enough to pass
constitutional muster.75
In the aftermath of the Lutz decision, challenges to statutes
regulating cruising or other aimless driving met with mixed results, both
within and outside of the Third Circuit.76 The only major success came
outside of the Third Circuit in the Minnesota state Court of Appeals.77
In a Minneapolis suburb, an ordinance was passed prohibiting “driving
three or more times in a designated no-cruising zone between 9:00 p.m.
and 2:00 a.m.”78 Citing Lutz extensively and reviewing under
intermediate scrutiny, the court found that the ordinance was not
narrowly tailored to pass constitutional muster, and that it constituted an
unconstitutional violation of the fundamental right to intrastate
movement.79 The court specifically looked to the legislative findings
69

Id.
Id. at 269.
71
Id.
72
Lutz, 899 F.2d at 269.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 270.
75
Id.
76
Gofman, supra note 1, at 22.
77
Gofman, supra note 1, at 22 (citing State v. Stallman, 519 N.W.2d 903, 90610 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994)).
78
Gofman, supra note 1, at 22 (quoting State v. Stallman, 519 N.W.2d 903, 90610 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994)).
79
Gofman, supra note 1, at 22 (citing Stallman, 519 N.W.2d at 906-10).
70
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behind the ordinance’s passage—claims regarding increased fighting,
traffic violations, drug dealing, and other criminal activity—and found
that all of them were already flatly prohibited by state and local law.80
Therefore, the new anti-cruising ordinance is not narrowly tailored to
address the alleged problems. The court found that “there [was] no hole
in the Minnesota Criminal Code for this cruising ordinance to plug.”81
This conclusion implies that narrowly tailoring an ordinance to solve an
important government interest necessitates some prior loophole or clear
shortcoming of existing legislation.82 Layering new statutes on top of
existing statutes does not meet the standard necessary to pass
constitutional muster.83
Following the ruling in Lutz, courts within the Third Circuit put the
holding framework into action in subsequent cases, determining what
government interest is important enough to pass the bar under
intermediate scrutiny. In Snowden v. State,84 the Supreme Court of
Delaware applied the test set out in Lutz to a criminal case. Here, the
defendant Snowden was convicted of stalking for repeatedly following
and calling a coworker and was sentenced to two years probation.85
Two years later—after the no-contact order expired—the defendant
again began following the victim.86 The defendant conducted his
stalking by assessing the location of the victim and then following her
driving at a short distance along public roads.87 After several
occurrences, the defendant was again arrested and convicted.88 Among
several other arguments on appeal, the defendant contended that the
anti-stalking statute under which he was convicted violated his
constitutional right to localized intrastate travel—a fundamental right
per Lutz.89 Snowden claimed that the anti-stalking statute
unconstitutionally prohibited free travel on public roads and that his
arrest and conviction was for his exercise of this constitutionally
protected right to drive where he pleased on public roads—regardless of
whether that was where the victim was also driving at the same time.90

80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

Gofman, supra note 1, at 22 (citing Stallman, 519 N.W.2d at 906-10).
Gofman, supra note 1, at 22 (quoting Stallman, 519 N.W.2d at 906-10).
Gofman, supra note 1, at 23 (citing Stallman, 519 N.W.2d at 906-10).
Gofman, supra note 1, at 23 (citing Stallman, 519 N.W.2d at 906-10).
677 A.2d 33 (Del. 1996).
Id. at 35.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 35-36.
Id. at 36.
Snowden, 677 A.2d at 37.
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The court rejected Snowden’s argument.91 Although the court
conceded that under the Lutz precedent localized intrastate travel along
public roads is indeed a constitutionally protected right, it found that the
governmental objective of protecting individuals from stalking and
other harassing behavior was sufficient to pass intermediate scrutiny as
an important state interest.92 The court held that the interest of
“preventing the emotional harm to individuals caused through fear and
loss of privacy, as well as the more general societal interest in fostering
a sense of security” constituted an important government interest, and
statutes to this effect will be held constitutional.93 Likewise, the court
found that the regulated behavior in this statute does not bear a strong
burden on any exercise of the right to localized intrastate travel because
its limitations on travel do not extend to “unintentional [travel] or . . .
travel serv[ing] a legitimate purpose.”94
Looking outside the Third Circuit, the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri has also examined the issue of
localized intrastate movement.95 In Townes v. City of St. Louis, the
court examined a city ordinance that temporarily closed a public street
for a period of six months.96 The ordinance passed as an emergency
measure at the request of local residents, who claimed that excess traffic
through the street brought negative effects on quality of life, including
increased criminal activity.97 The residents and the city aldermen
supporting the ordinance believed a temporary end to traffic would help
“stabilize” the street and surrounding neighborhood, and thus reduce
crime.98 The ordinance was enforced by the deployment of several
large flower pots along the road’s entrance from the nearest avenue.99
The plaintiff—a resident of the street—challenged the
constitutionality of the ordinance, alleging, among other things, that it
violated her substantive due process right to localized intrastate travel
along a public street to access her residence.100 On the other hand, the
city contended that no such right existed, as this jurisdiction is outside
the Third Circuit, and the ruling in Lutz did not apply.101 The court
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101

Id. at 38.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Townes v. City of St. Louis, 949 F. Supp. 731, 732 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
Id. at 733.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 734.
Townes, 949 F. Supp. at 734.
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examined the holding in Lutz, as well as Eighth Circuit precedent
regarding substantive due process, and concluded that the Eighth Circuit
would most likely not establish the same holding as the Third Circuit.102
Nonetheless, the court decided to review the St. Louis ordinance
under intermediate scrutiny to determine whether it passes muster.103 In
the city’s favor, the court considered how minimal the effects of the
ordinance are on area residents.104 The flower pots did not shut off all
routes to the street, and slightly longer alternative routes still existed.105
Likewise, the ordinance left access to other government services—such
as fire protection, police, and emergency services—unchanged.106 In
sum, the court found that the plaintiff was at best “marginally
inconvenienced” by the ordinance.107 On the other hand, the court
examined the proffered government interest underlying the ordinance—
the apparent proliferation of crime along the effected street.108 The
plaintiff contended that the appropriate response to the government
interest in stopping criminal activity is calling for a police response or
increased police activity—not inconveniencing area residents.109
Under intermediate scrutiny, the court found that “the existence of
this alternative method of dealing with the criminal activity in the 6100
block (e.g., increased police patrolling) may be relevant as a limitation
on the authority of the city to act, if the court was required to subject the
ordinance to strict constitutional scrutiny.”110 Therefore, were this case
governed by Third Circuit precedent, intermediate scrutiny would not
have been met, and the ordinance would likely be found
unconstitutional.111 However, the court rejected its earlier argument
supporting intermediate scrutiny, determining that in the Eighth Circuit
this level of scrutiny is not yet necessary.112 As such, the court then
applied the rational basis test of constitutional scrutiny. 113 Under this
test, a statute must only be rationally related to a government interest to
pass constitutional muster.114 This is a low bar, and courts generally
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114

Id. at 735.
Id.
Id. at 736.
Id.
Id.
Townes, 949 F. Supp. at 736.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Townes, 949 F. Supp. at 736.
Id.
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only strike statutes if they are so irrational as to “shock the
conscience.”115 Under the rational basis standard of review, the
ordinance easily passes, as reducing crime is a government interest and
reducing traffic is rationally related to achieving that goal.116 The court
specifically states the reported result of the ordinance’s implementation,
finding that a showing of reduced crime furthers the notion that the
ordinance was rationally related to the stated outcome.117 Therefore, the
plaintiff’s claim of unconstitutionality under substantive due process
grounds fails.118
The United States District Court for the Middle District of North
Carolina—outside of the Third Circuit—has also examined a statute
under the test presented in Lutz.119 In Shanks v. Forsyth County Park
Authority, a county parks authority enacted a resolution banning entry
of motorcycles into a public park.120 The plaintiff was an avid
motorcyclist who attempted to enter the park on his motorcycle to
participate in a charity ride event.121 In addition to other constitutional
claims, the plaintiff alleged that an ordinance banning motorcycle entry
violated his substantive due process right to localized intrastate travel.122
Although not required to follow the precedent set in Lutz, the court
nevertheless quoted the holding and test positively and examined the
circumstances of the case as if bound by Lutz.123 Recognizing a
fundamental right to localized intrastate movement, the court found that
the resolution banning motorcycle entry passed constitutional muster
not because it passed intermediate scrutiny, but rather because it did not
implicate any right of movement at all.124 The issue is avoided for two
main reasons.125 First, the court distinguished a right to travel to the
park versus a right to travel around the park.126 This regulation only
implicates the right to travel around a set area, not the right to travel to a
place.127 Second, the court distinguished a ban on entry generally from

115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Shanks v. Forsyth Cnty. Park Auth., 869 F. Supp. 1231 (M.D.N.C. 1994).
Id. at 1233.
Id.
Id. at 1237.
Id.
Id. at 1238.
Shanks, 869 F. Supp. at 1238.
Id.
Id.
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a ban on entry via the means of a motorcycle.128 If a fundamental right
to localized intrastate movement along publicly accessible property
exists, then that right is satisfied by entry or transit through a means of
movement—not necessarily through every means.129 As such, a
government entity may determine which means are appropriate for
movement in a particular area.130 Here, the court found that the plaintiff
could easily get off his motorcycle and enter the park on foot, by
bicycle, or through other permitted means, satisfying his right to
movement and entry.131 Taking these two factors together, the court
found that the resolution did not implicate the constitutional right to
localized intrastate travel.132
Returning to Third Circuit jurisdictions, the issue of localized
intrastate travel was most recently examined in two New Jersey cases.
The first of which, Lanin v. Borough of Tenafly,133 was decided by the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. In that case,
the plaintiffs reside on a street shared by a school.134 The Borough of
Tenafly promulgated ordinances making the street one-way during
school hours, eliminating on-street parking, and constructing a student
drop-off zone along the street.135 The plaintiffs alleged, in part, that
their substantive due process rights to localized intrastate travel had
been violated by the ordinances because the newly increased and
irregular traffic patterns force them to change and delay their regular
travel routes.136 The court dismissed these claims, finding that
“[t]raffic, even if it can be attributed to poor public planning, is not a
deprivation of a fundamental right.”137 Likewise, the court found that
“tak[ing] a route that turns out to be more circuitous when viewed from
the perspective of a particular property owner’s driveway” does not
constitute a deprivation of a fundamental right.138 According to the
court, to violate the constitutional right to localized intrastate travel, a
burden must actually prevent travel—not simply render it more difficult
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or inconvenient.139 This lack of a describable burden is especially
important relative to the compelling government interest in maintaining
a school premises.140
The issue came up again in Galicki v. New Jersey,141 which was
also decided by the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey. The events in Galicki concern a high-profile political scandal in
which state officials allegedly ordered some points of access to the
George Washington Bridge closed to punish disloyal local political
figures.142 Among numerous other claims, the plaintiffs in this case—
made up of local residents and commuters angered by the delays caused
by the closures—asserted a violation to their fundamental substantive
due process rights to localized intrastate travel.143 Decided after Lanin,
both plaintiffs and defendants tailored their response to conform to the
recent holding holding.144 Plaintiffs argued that, short of simply
inconveniencing their commute, the closures amounted to a total denial
of access to many routes—trapping some at home.145 On the other
hand, the defendants likened plaintiffs’ grievances to those of the
plaintiffs in Lanin—anger about a slight inconvenience or somewhat
longer commute but not sufficient enough to amount to a significant
burden.146 The court distinguished this case from Lanin because of the
defendants’ intent in each case.147 In Lanin, the defendant borough
sought to ease traffic congestion to a school—a laudable government
interest.148 In this case, the defendants allegedly exacted the closure out
of spite.149 Because the intent behind the alleged planned closure was
vindictive in nature and designed to delay or divert commuters, the
court found that no government interest existed to justify the closure.150
As such, the closure amounted to an unconstitutional violation of
commuters’ rights to localized intrastate (and interstate) movement.151
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II. ANALYSIS

The ordinance passed by the municipality of Leonia sought to bar
drivers who are not residents of Leonia or employed at a location in
Leonia from driving through the municipality during rush hour.152
Local residents and employees would be marked so as to allow them to
pass without being stopped.153 Applying the above cases to the Leonia
ordinance does not provide a clean-cut answer to the question of
whether this ordinance passes constitutional muster. Nevertheless, a
court would likely hold the ordinance unconstitutional. As Third
Circuit precedent governs in New Jersey, it is worth examining the
ordinance under Lutz first, as this test is the one a court must apply.
Under the intermediate scrutiny standard, Leonia would have to
demonstrate that keeping vehicles out serves an important government
interest and that the ordinance is narrowly tailored to achieve that stated
objective.154 Managing traffic flow during rush hour would most likely
constitute an important government objective, just as general traffic
flow management was recognized as an important objective in Lutz.155
Likewise, Leonia can demonstrate that traffic leading to the George
Washington Bridge renders rush hour traffic particularly disruptive and
in need of government intervention.156 However, the Leonia ordinance
is likely not the most narrowly tailored option to achieve the goal of
limiting congestion. First, keeping all outside drivers off the road—
regardless of their origin, destination, or the duration of their drive
within Leonia—represents a major inconvenience to drivers from
neighboring towns, and a clear windfall to Leonia residents. In Lanin,
the holding states that taking a more circuitous route is not a deprivation
of a fundamental right; however, Galicki modified that holding to
include more deference to intent and effect.157 Here, it appears Leonia’s
intent in promulgating the ordinance was neutral—a simple desire to
help its own residents. However, if a plaintiff can demonstrate that
Leonia sought to help its own residents to the exclusion and detriment
of the residents of neighboring towns, then the ordinance would fail
constitutional scrutiny as not sufficiently narrowly tailored.
The regulation in Shanks is distinguishable from the Leonia
152
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ordinance. There, the regulation barred entry of a particular mode of
transit through a public park.158 Here, a broader ban exists on all motor
vehicles entering a municipality. The court in Shanks established that a
right to intrastate localized movement constitutes movement by a means
to a publicly accessible location, not necessarily around one.159 Here,
travel to points in Leonia is entirely barred to non-residents during rush
hour, unless traveling by foot or other non-motorized transport. This
restriction is significantly more burdensome on travelers than the park
regulation, necessitating a much more drastic change in mode of
transportation to reach a destination in Leonia. Therefore, it seems
unlikely a court would weigh the holding in Shanks as relevant to the
Leonia ordinance.
In Townes, the Court concluded that a blocked street did not
constitute a violation because of an important government interest.160
However, if the court had applied intermediate scrutiny, the ordinance
would have been struck down as overly broad.161 Other methods of
addressing the issue—such as increased police activity—amounted to
more narrowly tailored solutions to the proffered governmental
interest.162 Here, the town of Leonia has numerous potential options to
address congestion issues, short of a total ban. For instance, the town
could—taking a cue from the City of York in Lutz—just prohibit both
Leonia residents and outsiders from excessively repetitive driving
around Leonia during rush hour. The court in Lutz held that such a
regulation is constitutional, and it amounts to a less restrictive means
than a total ban.163 According to city planning experts, Leonia could
also pursue less restrictive means by changing the layout and flow of
some of its more congested routes—governmental functions broadly
within its police powers and far less restrictive than the total ban.164
Under this reading of intermediate scrutiny—although not holding
precedent—the Leonia ordinance must also fail.
On the other hand, proponents of the Leonia ordinance could
argue—per Lanin and Snowden—that the municipality simply seeks to
protect its residents’ safety and well-being. Were a court to find that
safety is the main interest behind the ordinance like in Snowden, the
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ordinance could pass intermediate scrutiny.165 The distinctions between
Snowden and the Leonia ordinance are vast—one seeks to prevent
harassing and potentially violent behavior, whereas the other addresses
traffic. Nevertheless, if a court were to draw a line between the two
cases, a challenger would perhaps find a greater likelihood of success
challenging the law under other grounds—such as Equal Protection.
Similarly, were proponents of the ordinance to draw from the case
regarding the Minnesota ordinance directly succeeding Lutz, they could
argue that unlike the case there, the important governmental need in
Leonia is not addressed by already-existing law in any form—
necessitating a change.
III. CONCLUSION

Under the balance of case law, a court would most likely strike the
Leonia ordinance as unconstitutional because the ordinance does not
amount to a narrowly tailored solution to an important government
interest.
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